Economic Assessment of FMDv Releases from the National Bio and Agro Defense Facility by Pendell, Dustin L. et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Economic Assessment of FMDv Releases from
the National Bio and Agro Defense Facility
Dustin L. Pendell1*, Thomas L. Marsh2, Keith H. Coble3, Jayson L. Lusk4, Sara
C. Szmania5
1 Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, United States of
America, 2 School of Economic Sciences and Paul G. Allen School for Global Animal Health, Washington
State University, Pullman, Washington, United States of America, 3 Department of Agricultural Economics,
Mississippi State University, Starkville, Mississippi, United States of America, 4 Department of Agricultural
Economics, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, United States of America, 5 Signature
Science, LLC, Austin, Texas, United States of America
* dpendell@ksu.edu
Abstract
This study evaluates the economic consequences of hypothetical foot-and-mouth disease
releases from the future National Bio and Agro Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas.
Using an economic framework that estimates the impacts to agricultural firms and consum-
ers, quantifies costs to non-agricultural activities in the epidemiologically impacted region,
and assesses costs of response to the government, we find the distribution of economic
impacts to be very significant. Furthermore, agricultural firms and consumers bear most of
the impacts followed by the government and the regional non-agricultural firms.
Introduction
Scientific laboratories designed to study diseases are not completely risk free, and the possibility
exists that accidents of nature or deliberate acts of terror might cause the spread of a disease
that the facility is trying to prevent. On the one hand animal and human health officials in the
United States are interested in preventing the introduction and spread of diseases like Ebola,
Rift Valley Fever or Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, while on the other hand scientists
within the United States need small quantities of these materials for study and to develop
response strategies should an outbreak occur. It is a tenuous balancing act with tradeoffs that
can be staggering varying in outcomes and economic value. This study considers a timely and
relevant case, food-and-mouth-disease (FMD), in one such facility, the National Bio and Agro
Defense Facility (NBAF). We couple outcome from plume and epidemiological models with an
economic model to calculate the potential economic consequences of several critical types of
accidental releases from a research facility. The approaches used here are likely to have applica-
tion for other diseases and research facilities, and in providing a monetary estimate of the risks
posed by such facilities that can be compared against the benefits of better preparedness. In
2009, Manhattan, Kansas was selected as the site for the new National Bio and Agro Defense
Facility. It is intended to replace the current research facility at Plum Island Animal Disease
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Center (PIADC) in New York, the primary animal disease research facility since 1954, to
enhance research and education. The FY 2010 DHS Appropriation Act (P.L. 111–83), however,
would not allow funds to be made available for construction of NBAF until:
“. . .a site-specific bio-safety and bio-security mitigation risk assessment, which includes an
integrated set of analyses using plume modeling and epidemiologic impact modeling. . .,
and the results of the National Academy of Sciences’ review of the risk assessment. . .”[1].
Economic analysis is congressionally mandated as part of the site specific risk assessment,
necessary to link outcomes from the plume and epidemiological models to risk outcomes. A
focal point of the risk assessment centers on potential accidental releases of viruses from NBAF
and the subsequent consequences of such releases. Releases of viruses from research facilities
are not necessarily common, but have uncertain economic consequences and have occurred in
the past[2].
The purpose of the current study is to estimate the economic consequences associated with
unintentional, hypothetical releases of foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDv) from NBAF. Spe-
cifically, we assess the economic consequences to agricultural firms and consumers, quantify
costs and disruptions to non-agricultural activities in the epidemiologically impacted region,
and assess costs of response to the government. Different from previous economic studies of
FMD outbreaks in the United States [3–6] and across the world [7], the current study is unique
as it examines unintentional aerosol, liquid waste, transference, and tornado releases from an
animal research facility. This set of releases provides a nearly complete coverage of the feasible
risk space, providing a broad landscape over which release events could translate into a range
of economic consequences. Given the inherent uncertainty in an FMD outbreak, economic
consequences are assessed over a distribution of epidemiological outcomes. Finally, the exten-
sive and intensive nature of this site specific risk assessment (e.g., plume, epidemiological,
socioeconomic data, information, and modeling) over a large study region is unprecedented in
previous FMD studies focused on the U.S.
The findings of this study have important implications from modeling to policy. First, the
distribution of economic consequences between unannounced (aerosol, liquid waste, and
transference) and announced (tornados) releases are differentiated. While the releases are
hypothetical, they are plausible as demonstrated by recent, similar FMDv events occurring
across the world[2]. Second, a multi-step risk assessment evolved whereby an updated site spe-
cific risk assessment followed the initial site specific risk assessment. A purpose of the updated
risk assessment is to respond to limitations identified by both the National Academy of Sci-
ences and public comments. Third, mitigation control includes stamping out, vaccinate-to-live,
and vaccinate-to-kill. A concern is that in the event of large outbreaks killing all infected ani-
mals may not be feasible. Fourth, uncertainty is carried from the plume model through the
epidemiologic model outcomes to the economic assessment, identifying distributions of poten-
tial economic outcomes and not a simple point estimate of economic consequences. Finally,
intertemporal welfare effects are differentiated across agricultural firms and commodities from
production to feeding, processing, and down the supply chain to consumption. As a result, we
are able to examine the impacts of FMDv releases over time and across commodities along the
supply chain.
Background
There is an urgent need to develop better surveillance, diagnostics, response, and recovery to
contagious diseases. Between 1940 and 2004, 60% (or 335) of emerging infectious diseases in
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the United States were zoonotic, a disease that is transmissible between animals and humans,
with 72% originating from wildlife [8]. Trends suggest that the frequency of emerging infec-
tious diseases will continue to increase, especially with the growing interface between humans,
animals, and wildlife [9].
Potential transmission and spread of foreign animal diseases (FAD) and zoonotic diseases
are driven by some of the same forces that propel the global economy. Globalization has
increased both international trade and human mobility. As the world human population and
standard of living continues to grow, there is, and will be a continued increase in demand for
protein from livestock. The United Nations World Tourism Organization [10] forecasts a 3 to
4% increase over 2012s record one billion international tourist arrivals worldwide in 2013.
The economic losses associated with emerging, highly contagious FADs and zoonotic dis-
eases can be significant. According to the World Bank [11], the direct costs (e.g., costs to public
and animal health services and producer compensation for culled animals) and indirect costs
(e.g., trade and tourism) of outbreaks during the 2000s surpassed $20 billion and $200 billion,
respectively. Hosono et al. [12] estimated that the 1998–1999 Nipah Virus outbreak in Malay-
sia resulted in $90 million in losses from culled animals and $170 million in indirect effects.
The 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in East Asia and Canada resulted
in estimated losses of $40 to $50 billion [11]. In the 2001 FMD outbreak in the UK that lasted
more than 220 days in duration, over six million animals were culled with estimated losses of
$10 billion to $12 billion [13].
Animal agriculture is important to the U.S. economy as it is a primary source of food and
nutrition, a major contributor to exports, and it is valued at $165 billion [14]. With such a vital
industry, the United States needs to position itself to defend against the threat of FADs and
zoonotic diseases. To do so, a modern biocontainment laboratory that is capable of conducting
research and developing vaccines against such diseases is required, yet the United States does
not currently have one. In 2004, in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9):
Defense of United States Agriculture and Food, the Administration showed the need for such a
facility:
“The Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security will develop a plan to provide safe,
secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories that research and
develop diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases” [15].
There are 14 foot-and-mouth disease virus incidents known or believed to have been
released over the past 50 years from biocontainment research laboratories worldwide, includ-
ing Czechoslovakia, Demark, Germany, Spain, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States [2].
Because of potential release and subsequent consequences of a contagious infectious disease,
proper analyses and reviews must be conducted before constructing a new state-of-the-art bio-
containment research facility.
The National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility
Research on FADs, such as FMDv, is conducted in biocontainment research laboratories
throughout the world, including the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health
(Winnipeg, Canada), Australian Animal Health Laboratory (Geelong, Australia), the Institute
for Animal Health (Pirbright, United Kingdom), and the Friedrich-Loeffler-Institute (Riems,
Germany). In the United States, Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) in New York
has been the livestock disease research facility since 1954. However, the Department of
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Homeland Security [16] has noted that PIADC is at “the end of its lifecycle and is too small to
meet the nation's research needs”.
It is the intent that NBAF will: (1) replace and enhance the current research at PIADC; (2)
enhance research capabilities diagnosing foreign animal, emerging and zoonotic diseases in
large animal livestock; (2) develop new vaccines and other countermeasures for large animal
livestock; (3) train veterinarians and animal agricultural specialists in preparing for and
responding to animal diseases; and (4) give the United States its only BSL-4 research capacity
of high-consequence diseases affecting large animal livestock. Because of two Government
Accountability Office [2, 17] reports, the FY 2010 DHS Appropriation Act (P.L. 111–83)
would not allow funds to be made available for construction of NBAF until it completed a site
specific risk assessment to be reviewed by the National Academies of Sciences [1].
Following the Appropriations Act of 2010, DHS commissioned the Site-Specific Biosafety
and Biosecurity Mitigation Risk Assessment in 2010, including a review by the National Acad-
emy of Sciences (NAS). In the NAS review, they noted several shortcomings in the site specific
risk assessment (SSRA), including an inadequate qualitative risk assessment, underestimation
of the risk of a pathogen release and transmissions, and methodological flaws of the plume and
epidemiological modeling [18]. To address these shortcomings, DHS conducted an Updated
Site-Specific Biosafety and Biosecurity Mitigation Risk Assessment in 2012 [16], which was also
reviewed by the National Academy of Sciences [19]. The information from initial risk assess-
ment completed in 2010 was used in altering the design of NBAF and changing the standard
operating procedures, personnel training, and emergency response planning. For example, the
initial design of NBAF would withstand wind speeds of 90 miles per hour [20]. Following the
updated risk assessment, the design of NBAF was modified to conform to nuclear regulatory
standards and withstand with up to 228 miles per hour [16].
Modeling Framework
To assess the economic impacts of unintentional FMDv releases from NBAF, we follow [4, 7,
21–22] to link supply shocks from an animal disease spread model with a multi-commodity,
multi-market partial equilibrium model. This is supplemented with a regional input-output
economic model to capture impacts on allied and associated businesses [4, 21]. Additional eco-
nomic shocks include domestic and international markets, which are discussed in detail below.
Government costs associated with controlling and eradicating and FMD outbreak are calcu-
lated as well.
Epidemiological Disease Spread Model
The epidemiological disease spread model used in this study is the North American Animal
Disease Spread Model (NAADSM). NAADSM is a spatial, stochastic, state-transition simula-
tion model that simulates highly contagious animal diseases [23]. NAADSM has been used in
numerous studies to evaluate the impacts of highly contagious animal diseases in various coun-
tries including several economic impact studies [3–4, 6, 21–22]. The NAADSM framework
requires extensive parameterization including information on animal population (e.g., loca-
tion, production type, size of herd), disease manifestation (e.g., latently infected), disease trans-
mission (e.g., direct, indirect, and aerosol), disease detection, surveillance, and control (e.g.,
animal movements, traceability, and vaccination). The parameters can take on an integer value
(e.g., number of herds destroyed per day), probability (e.g., probability of infection given expo-
sure to an infected herd), probability density function (e.g., length of time that an infected herd
is subclinically infectious) or relational function (e.g., probability of detecting an infectious
herd, which is a function of clinical signs being observed and being reported to authorities once
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clinical signs have been observed). The parameters are developed through literature searches,
research, and expert opinions. Given the epidemiological output is exogenous input into the
economic model, and not the primary focus of this paper, the reader is referred to DHS [16,
section 6.1.4] for complete documentation of the parameter values used in this study.
NAADSM is simulated 200 times for each scenario to generate a distribution of disease
spread outcomes. In addition to the uncertainty resulting from the stochastic disease spread
model, different starting locations for infection are also incorporated to better reflect uncer-
tainty. Unlike previous studies which pick a specific starting location (e.g., cow-calf operation
or feedlot operation) to model the consequences of an FMD outbreak, this study includes all
possible starting locations (e.g., cow-calf operations, feedlot operations, etc.) for each release
scenario. In other words, for each starting location the FMD outbreak is modeled and the con-
sequences are ranked. It is then possible to report the outbreak consequences at the probability
levels (e.g., P5, P50, and P95) for the different starting locations.
Economic Model
Agricultural Firms and Consumers. A quarterly multi-market partial equilibrium simu-
lation model is used to assess how unintentional releases of FMDv would impact U.S. agricul-
tural producers and consumers. This study utilizes an updated version of the Paarlberg et al.
[22] partial equilibrium model. The partial equilibrium model includes major agricultural sec-
tors along vertical and horizontal market chains beginning with livestock and grain production
to meat processing and the final consumer, including both domestic and international. Exoge-
nous, production, domestic demand, and international trade, shocks resulting from an FMD
outbreak are incorporated into the model as percentage changes from the baseline. The eco-
nomic model then solves for the percent changes in the endogenous variables (prices and quan-
tities) for each quarter. The percent changes in the endogenous variables are then applied to a
baseline defined by the observed data for the first quarter of 2009 through the fourth quarter of
2018 of no-disease. This results in estimated changes in per capita consumer welfare and
changes in quasi-profits and captured by returns to capital and management.
Parameters for the partial equilibrium model include livestock-feed balance information,
revenue and factor shares, and elasticities. The livestock-feed balance information, revenue
shares, and factor shares are retained as defined in [22]. The retail elasticity values for final
meat demand for beef, pork, and poultry [24], lamb [25], and milk [26] are updated for this
study. Substitution elasticities for derived demand and trade elasticities remained unchanged.
Producer expectations regarding expected future returns are modeled as naïve expectations
[27]. Livestock supply, use, and price data, as well as forage prices are from the Livestock Mar-
keting Information Center [28]. Coarse grains, wheat, rice, and the soybean complex supply,
use, and price data are from Outlook Reports and Data prepared by the USDA-Economic
Research Service [29]. Total quarterly use was generated by feed balance equations from which
data on animal numbers are combined with standard feeding practices to produce quarterly
amounts of forage and pasture. Hay, corn silage, and sorghum silage production is reported by
the National Agricultural Statistics [30]. Uncut grazed pasture is imputed for quarters 2 and 3.
International trade data are derived from LMIC [28], USDA-ERS [31], and Foreign Agricul-
tural Service [32]. Information concerning the crop policy mechanisms are from Provisions of
the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 [33] and the 2002 Farm Act
[34].
Regional Non-Agricultural Sector. Assessing the costs and disruptions to the non-agri-
cultural activities in the epidemiologically impacted region can be very important [4, 21].
Thompson et al. [13] estimates that the direct losses of tourism following the 2001 UK FMD
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outbreak were equal to the losses to the agricultural sector, excluding the producer compensa-
tion from the government. Furthermore, the indirect effects to tourism were more than 20
times larger when compared to the indirect effects to agriculture. The regional impacts in this
study are estimated using an input-output model which is a system of equations that describe
the flow of income and product throughout an economy. Specifically, the Bureau of Economic
Analysis’s Regional Input-Output Modeling System (RIMSII) is used because they provide a
well-accepted and validated methodology to evaluate these impacts. Moreover, the input-out-
put industrial multipliers provide the flexibility to define the states defined by the disease
spread model.
RIMSII integrates the input and output relationships of approximately 500 U.S. industries
and regional economic accounts. The final-demand multipliers for output are used to estimate
the indirect economic activity generated by a specific economic activity in a region. Thus, the
intent of using the RIMSII data is to measure the effects of an FMD outbreak on the non-agri-
cultural regional economy. Calculations are structured to remove duplication or double count-
ing of losses. The indirect effects evaluated include: (1) the effect of culling and destroying
animals on the non-agricultural regional economy (e.g., retail trade); (2) the economic implica-
tion of a travel ban that would limit recreational and non-essential travel in and out of a region;
and (3) the indirect effects from the stimulus to the region created by the expenditures during
government eradication and clean-up efforts. Travel bans, resulting in reduced tourism, are
another important source of potential economic losses for the impacted region [35]. Travel
bans composed of transit and ground transportation; spectator sports; hotels and motels; and
food and drink services are evaluated.
The economic impact from the loss in travel expenditures can be measured using RIMSII
[36]. Total domestic travel expenditures for overnight trips and day trips of over 50 miles in
2007 were obtained from the U.S. Statistical abstract produced by the U.S. Census Bureau by
state. However, the RIMSII data separates the economic effects of various forms of travel
(Table 1). Thus, using data on the percentage allocations of travel expenditures from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, expenditures are allocated by category for each state in the study
region [37].
While not insignificant, travel and tourism is not a dominant sector in the region. Kansas,
Nebraska, and Oklahoma each constitute less than 1% of the U.S. domestic travel visits and
expenditures (3.1% combined). Travel and tourism are more important in Texas, Colorado
and Missouri which contribute 6.7%, 2.0% and 1.8% of domestic travel visits and expenditures,
respectively. Travel expenditures, by state, for trips of over 50 miles were obtained from the U.
S. Census Bureau. Additionally, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports the percentage of
allocations of travel expenditures. Thus, using data on the percentage allocations of travel
expenditures, expenditures were allocated by category (e.g., air transportation) for each state in
the study region [16]). It appears likely that in major outbreaks travel restrictions to non-agri-
cultural events will be lifted after two quarters so a maximum reduction of 4% of annual travel
Table 1. Allocation of Travel Expenditure by Category (%).
Category %
Air Transportation 29.10
Transit and Ground Passenger Transportation 13.95
Spectator Sports 10.80
Hotels and Motels, Including Casino Hotels 19.08
Food Service 27.08
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129134.t001
Economic Assessment of FMDv Releases
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0129134 June 26, 2015 6 / 22
is realized. For outbreaks of less than two quarters, the travel reduction is computed from the
number of days the outbreak lasts as a percentage of a full year’s reduction.
Government Costs
Typical government costs associated with eradicating an FMD outbreak are calculated. These
costs include appraisal, cleaning and disinfection, disposal, euthanasia, indemnification, quar-
antine, surveillance, and vaccination. Indemnification payments reflect the value of culled ani-
mals at average market prices in the first quarter of 2009 prior to an FMDv release. Table 2
reports the government costs used in this study which are based on published literature [38–
39] and the non-indemnification costs per animal are consistent in magnitude with those
reported by Abdalla et al. [40].
Exogenous Shocks
An FMD outbreak would result in shocks to production, domestic demand, and international
trade [5, 7, 22]. These shocks are expressed as percentage changes for each quarter and incor-
porated into the economic model.
Production (Supply) Shock. Output from the disease spread model is used to estimate the
production or supply shocks. Specifically, the number of animals culled by production type, by
quarter is used to calculate the percentage reduction in supply. Additionally, two emergency
vaccinations scenarios are assumed: vaccinate-to-kill and vaccinate-to-live. No federal vaccina-
tion policy for FMD exists in the U.S. and no definitive precedent was uncovered in previous
studies. After discussions with members of a U.S. government review panel, the vaccination-
to-live and vaccination-to-kill policies were defined for this study as initial assessment. It is
realized that different assumptions concerning a vaccination policy could be made (see [3]).
For outbreaks<180 days, the vaccinate-to-kill scenario is assumed where all vaccinated ani-
mals are assumed to be culled. For outbreaks>180 days, it is assumed that culling of the vacci-
nated cattle will occur until the 180th day of the outbreak and then afterwards, any vaccinated
cattle in the queue to be culled or newly vaccinated cattle will not be culled and remain in the
cattle inventory. Depending on the scenario (vaccinate-to-kill or vaccinate-to-live), the number
of animals culled and/or animals vaccinated listed in Table 3 and Table 4 are used in calculat-
ing the production shock, respectively.
Table 2. Government Costs used in Mitigating and Eradicating an FMDOutbreak.
Cost Category Cow-Calf Dairy Feedlot Swine Sheep
Cost of appraisal for slaughter ($/Herd)a 95.35 95.35 238.37 95.35 95.35
Cost of cleaning and disinfection ($/herd)a 1,776.40 3,762.80 11,173.75 1,279.81 1,776.40
Fixed costs of surveillance ($/herd)b 225.7 225.7 225.7 225.7 225.7
Variable costs of surveillance ($/visit)b 84.64 84.64 112.85 84.64 84.64
Quarantine costs($/animal/day)b 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41
Euthanasia ($/animal)a 27.91 5.7 5.79 27.91 4.1
Carcass disposal ($/animal)a 14.97 2.24 2.08 2.89 14.97
Fixed costs of vaccination ($/herd)b 338.55 564.25 902.8 654.25 338.55
Variable costs of vaccination ($/animal)b 6.77 6.77 6.77 6.77 6.77
Note: Assumed 28 day quarantine period with all susceptible premises in each state incurring quarantine. Assumed 3 surveillance visits per herd.
a Inﬂated to 2009 dollars [39].
b Inﬂated to 2009 dollars [38].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129134.t002
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Domestic Demand Shock. There are anticipated decreases in consumer demand, even
though FMD does not pose a human health concern. As such, reduction in U.S. consumer
demand is incorporated to allow variations in the level of consumer perception of food quality
[41]. These domestic demand shocks represent the share of the U.S. population decreasing con-
sumption of a final good and provide a policy instrument by which to manage impacts on final
demand. Because there have been no FMD events on the U.S. mainland since 1929, it is
Table 3. Number of Animals Depopulated by Production Type and Duration of FMDOutbreak.
Event Output/Location Duration (days) Vaccination* Production Type
Beef Slaughter Cattle Beef Cows Dairy Swine Sheep
Liquid Waste
p5/p5 0 V2K 0 0 0 0 0
p5/p50 0 V2K 0 0 0 0 0
p5/p95 15 V2K 21,640 25 0 0 0
p50/p5 78 V2K 1,093,786 5,667 6,507 105,646 608
p50/p50 424 V2L 2,707,326 53,592 81,606 2,012,587 12,884
p50/p95 473 V2L 5,864,177 140,795 399,528 6,376,951 119,768
p95/p5 335 V2L 3,548,413 0 0 2,504,141 0
p95/p50 492 V2L 10,333,905 276,457 807,009 14,758,579 73,298
p95/p95 533 V2L 12,324,616 338,167 1,175,595 13,440,254 72,937
Aerosol
p5/p5 28 V2K 13,665 0 88 0 4,368
p5/p50 48 V2K 44,905 1,038 678 16,463 4,511
p5/p95 180 V2K 767,388 10,305 29,982 162,219 1,042
p50/p5 83 V2K 537,320 3,789 1,452 53,757 435
p50/p50 424 V2L 2,998,536 52,026 63,523 3,856,818 10,418
p50/p95 473 V2L 7,943,054 289,095 552,631 10,131,995 66,806
p95/p5 492 V2L 11,035,317 154,198 758,512 13,547,509 111,235
p95/p50 492 V2L 10,357,307 276,457 837,208 14,633,068 73,298
p95/p95 533 V2L 12,354,311 338,167 1,161,410 13,453,333 72,937
Transference
p5/p5 35 V2K 207,849 793 224 10,252 5
p5/p50 48 V2K 283,757 838 224 11,910 5
p5/p95 420 V2L 811,038 13,413 14,663 89,342 5,798
p50/p5 266 V2L 3,417,986 0 0 2,596,428 0
p50/p50 424 V2L 3,417,986 0 0 2,596,428 0
p50/p95 473 V2L 4,322,953 60,553 158,820 2,207,841 10,731
p95/p5 492 V2L 10,013,500 101,207 420,751 10,640,659 116,893
p95/p50 492 V2L 11,082,943 154,198 675,692 13,799,764 111,235
p95/p95 533 V2L 10,391,913 223,173 763,259 13,784,818 73,298
Tornado
p5/p5 240 V2L 3,421,445 0 0 2,547,784 0
p5/p50 252 V2L 3,401,560 1,038 590 2,852,239 143
p5/p95 252 V2L 3,797,229 6,240 10,249 2,905,886 5,719
p50/p5 272 V2L 3,379,717 0 0 2,759,748 0
p50/p50 424 V2L 3,755,606 147 504 2,599,759 0
p50/p95 473 V2L 8,512,799 101,207 375,891 8,396,696 116,893
p95/p5 333 V2L 3,582,124 1,158 0 2,416,037 0
p95/p50 492 V2L 4,217,057 80,383 82,913 9,253,821 9,760
p95/p95 533 V2L 9,574,132 238,228 713,783 10,055,838 12,974
*V2K is vaccinate-to-kill, V2L is vaccinate-to-live.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129134.t003
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necessary to draw information from other events both domestically and internationally. Vari-
ous studies have quantified the impact of consumer demand in the United States to livestock
and meat disease outbreaks [41–45]. These studies all have similar conclusions; the impacts are
small and short lived, but the likelihood of larger responses coincided with larger outbreaks/
recalls. Although FMD has not occurred in recent history on the U.S. mainland, there have
been FMD outbreaks experienced in other countries, including the UK in 2001. Consumers in
the UK decreased their average weekly per capita carcass meat consumption from 235 grams in
Table 4. Number of Animals Vaccinated by Production Type.
Event Output/Location Production Type
Beef Slaughter Cattle Beef Cows Dairy Swine Sheep
Liquid Waste
p5/p5 0 0 0 0 0
p5/p50 0 0 0 0 0
p5/p95 1,513 6,642 525 1,944 445
p50/p5 558,237 572,587 30,573 701,383 32,083
p50/p50 2,674,860 2,468,126 504,503 21,585,087 310,240
p50/p95 3,830,901 10,242,637 877,355 26,840,569 1,166,088
p95/p5 919,314 3,224,388 139,881 801,670 145,166
p95/p50 8,682,751 20,620,026 1,714,854 29,677,167 1,936,414
p95/p95 7,911,697 21,792,460 1,650,836 31,526,353 2,148,883
Aerosol
p5/p5 5,048 30,848 1,104 3,672 1,492
p5/p50 115,651 134,906 25,423 731,283 9,009
p5/p95 465,865 1,235,676 53,852 921,923 64,157
p50/p5 177,582 364,830 16,911 451,631 24,521
p50/p50 2,960,231 5,099,550 515,408 22,353,735 411,781
p50/p95 4,941,577 14,733,683 875,965 25,788,110 1,148,413
p95/p5 7,288,962 15,182,268 1,359,066 30,865,915 1,552,347
p95/p50 8,317,797 20,559,373 1,650,610 29,879,112 1,923,440
p95/p95 7,906,093 21,591,189 1,615,099 31,643,619 2,138,106
Transference
p5/p5 24,472 33,938 1,289 21,058 4,156
p5/p50 141,976 86,811 3,089 150,330 6,392
p5/p95 744,111 662,275 70,573 2,443,715 50,374
p50/p5 692,486 2,573,193 48,822 568,146 110,748
p50/p50 3,452,187 3,080,166 559,902 22,002,431 335,381
p50/p95 5,494,909 15,502,989 1,033,836 25,232,099 1,425,357
p95/p5 7,026,349 15,253,943 1,298,846 30,119,740 1,546,958
p95/p50 8,236,661 18,135,449 1,599,610 27,766,499 1,806,057
p95/p95 7,865,919 21,867,560 1,568,794 31,672,812 2,137,911
Tornado
p5/p5 581,040 2,563,305 50,015 826,824 109,144
p5/p50 672,299 2,817,234 66,321 1,137,185 112,406
p5/p95 1,118,966 3,164,052 96,510 2,704,629 140,056
p50/p5 753,106 2,772,602 70,235 538,916 98,617
p50/p50 912,234 4,253,702 73,533 961,011 166,595
p50/p95 4,317,099 12,922,165 935,192 24,917,275 1,246,109
p95/p5 866,156 3,418,977 73,107 1,137,993 142,008
p95/p50 3,029,146 9,656,230 401,631 25,220,883 569,723
p95/p95 5,261,933 16,096,332 1,278,449 26,985,036 1,476,384
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129134.t004
Economic Assessment of FMDv Releases
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0129134 June 26, 2015 9 / 22
2001 to 229 grams in 2002 (or 2.7% decline). Consumption in the UK recovered to pre-out-
breaks levels by 2006 [46].
Given the above information, domestic demand shocks are specified for FMD across the
scenarios. Based on the epidemiological output (see Table 4) smaller (larger) outbreaks coin-
cided with outbreaks that lasted shorter (longer) than one quarter. Consequently, following an
FMD outbreak lasting less than one quarter, it was assumed that 5% of people would refrain
from consuming beef, pork, and lamb while 2.5% would stop consuming milk and dairy prod-
ucts during the outbreak. This is consistent with consumer reactions to food safety events
reported in [41, 44]. In the second quarter, domestic consumer demand for beef, pork and
lamb declined by 2.5% and was fully recovered (i.e., 0% decline) for dairy and milk products. It
is assumed that consumer demand for meat products would be fully recovered by the third
quarter.
In outbreaks lasting more one quarter, it was assumed that 10% of domestic consumers
would refrain from consuming beef, pork and lamb while 5% would stop consuming milk and
dairy products during the outbreak. Following the end of the outbreak, it was assumed that
domestic consumer demand would decrease by 5% for one quarter and 2.5% for another quar-
ter for beef, pork, and lamb. Consumer demand for dairy and milk products would decline by
2.5% for one quarter following the outbreak.
International Trade Shock. The magnitude and duration of trade shocks assumed in this
study are based on observations from previous events in throughout the world, including the
United States. In 2003 and 2004, due to isolated incidences of BSE, the U.S. and Canada faced
complete bans on beef in major overseas markets while beef and cattle imports and exports
continued among the North America Free Trade Agreement countries (Canada, Mexico, and
the United States) under a variety of restrictions [47]. The United States has experienced a long
recovery relative to pre-outbreak trade status as a result the isolated BSE events. U.S. beef
exports, as a percentage of beef production was 9.5% in 2003, dropped dramatically to 1.9% in
2004, and recovered to 7.4% in 2008 [28].
A review of previous literature is useful in identifying plausible time lengths defining trade
bans for our FMD scenarios. The EU imposed a one year ban on the UK following its 2001
FMD outbreak. Rich and Winter-Nelson [7] analyzed the 2000–2001 FMD outbreaks in the
southern cone of South America and concluded short lived impacts on exports to Argentina,
Brazil, and Uruguay. Randolph, Morrison, and Poulton [48] assumed a 12 month ban on
exports during FMD outbreaks in Zimbabwe. Nogueira et al. [49] and Tozer et al. [50] apply 1
to 2 year trade bans for hypothetical FMD outbreaks in Mexico and Australia, respectively.
Although the actual length of export restrictions will depend upon the actual product, disease,
trade agreements, and countries involved, these observations provide valuable information on
trade bans.
Given the information above, trade shocks are created in the following manner. First, 95%
of all U.S. exports of beef, pork, lamb meat, cattle, swine, and sheep are halted during the full
quarter of the outbreak and for one quarter after the last case appears. This assumes some pro-
cessed/cooked beef is still exported after the outbreak. The interruption of exports for one
quarter beyond the end of the outbreak (and for two quarters beyond the end of the outbreak
when emergency vaccination without slaughter is practiced) is consistent with World Organi-
zation for Animal Health (OIE) guidelines and practices (Chapter 8.5) during FMD outbreaks
[51]. Second, after the additional quarter ended with no FMD reported, it is assumed that grad-
ual recovery of U.S. exports will occur until it reaches the baseline levels. Full recovery is
assumed to occur in approximately two years following one full quarter after the outbreak is
eradicated. For FMD, the duration of the outbreak becomes a critical element in determining
the economic effects from trade disruptions.
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Study Region
The region of focus for this study includes seven states: Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri,
Nebraska, Oklahoma and Texas. In this region agriculture is economically important, espe-
cially for livestock. In 2009, cattle and calves are the most valuable agricultural commodity in
four states in the study [52]. All seven states are in the top 10 cattle and calves inventory with
45.1 million head (47.7% of total U.S. inventory) located in those seven states. Texas, Nebraska,
Kansas, Iowa, and Colorado are the five largest states with cattle on feed; almost 10 million
head on January 1, 2009 [52]. Furthermore, hogs are recognized as one of the top five commod-
ities those states. Total hog and pig inventory on December 1, 2008 for the region was 30.8 mil-
lion head (47.4% of total U.S. inventory). 31.2 percent of total U.S. sheep and lamb inventory
(1.8 million head) occurred in those seven states on January 1, 2009 [52]. Additionally, a signif-
icant percentage of state farm receipts in this region are derived from dairy.
A unique feature of this study when compared with previous work is the size of the livestock
population and number of herds. Most hypothetical FMD studies in the United States focus on
a small region at the state or county level [4, 6, 27, 38, 53–54]. With nearly 83.76 million head
and 0.45 million herds, this study contains one of the largest, if not the largest, number of sus-
ceptible animals/herds of any FMD economic modeling study (Table 5). The exact farm loca-
tions are not available in the United States. Location data typically exists for medium and large
sized operations. Smaller operations were accounted for by incorporating locations from a
dataset developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) using the NASS Agri-
cultural Census data from 2007 [55].The production types used in NAADSM are adjusted to
Table 5. Number of Animals and Herds by Production Type in Study Region.
Production Type1 Animals Herds
Cattle
Cow-calf 25,443,443 243,661
Dairy 2,377,253 5,565
Feedlot (small) 4,856,559 22,514
Feedlot (large) 11,465,365 1,797
Beef (backyard) 542,927 72,544
Total Cattle 44,685,547 346,081
Swine
Swine (small) 437,402 15,824
Swine (large) 34,487,716 11,818
Swine (backyard) 497,914 9,873
Total Swine 35,423,032 37,515
Small Ruminant
Goats 1,476,917 32,327
Sheep 2,065,225 13,518
Small ruminants (backyard) 113,263 19,273
Total Small Ruminant 3,655,405 65,118
1 The production types required by the partial equilibrium economic model are beef cattle, slaughter cattle,
dairy, swine and sheep. The production types used in NAADSM and listed in this Table are adjusted as
follows: Cow-Calf + Beef (backyard) = beef cattle; Feedlot (small) + Feedlot (large) = beef slaughter;
Dairy = dairy; Swine (small) + Swine (large) + Swine (backyard) = swine; Goats + Sheep + Small ruminants
(backyard) = sheep.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129134.t005
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allow for use in the partial equilibrium economic model. The production types required by the
partial equilibrium economic model are beef cattle, dairy, slaughter cattle, swine and sheep. As
such, the production types used in NAADSM (listed in Table 5) are adjusted as follows: Cow-
Calf + Beef (backyard) = beef cattle; Dairy = dairy; Feedlot (small) + Feedlot (large) = beef
slaughter; swine = Swine (small) + Swine (large) + Swine (backyard); Goats + Sheep + Small
ruminants (backyard) = sheep.
Release Events
As with any contagious disease research laboratory, there are multiple mechanisms and path-
ways in which a pathogen might be released from a containment laboratory. Such pathways
include: liquid (e.g., through a drain), solid waste (e.g., carcass disposal system), fomite and
vectors (e.g., clothing, mosquito), and aerosol (e.g., air filtration system). Although protocols to
reduce the risk of infectious material leaving the laboratory exist, it is impossible to eliminate
all of the risk associated when dealing with highly contagious pathogen research. Thus, four
plausible unintentional introduction events of the FMDv are evaluated. These events with
examples of actual releases include:
1. Liquid Waste Release
In August 2007, an FMD outbreak occurred near Pribright, UK. According to DEFRA [56],
it has been suggested that the probable cause of the outbreak was due to leaking drainage
pipes at the Institute for Animal Health, a zoonotic disease research laboratory.
2. Aerosol Release
In September 1971, an air leak in a gasket around a research laboratory door was the cause
of in an internal release of FMDv at PIADC [2]. This scenario represents the virus acciden-
tally released through an aerosol.
3. Transference Release
In August 1980, several steers at PIADC were found to contain a different strain of FMDv
than the vaccine research being conducted. Although the actual cause of this outbreak was
never determined, it is likely a laboratory worker carried and transmitted the virus to steers
[2].
4. Tornado Release
Although no know natural disaster has resulted in a release of FMDv, it is plausible that
such an event could occur as 42 tornados, on average, are reported with 120 nautical miles
of NBAF each year [16]. On June 11, 2008, an Enhanced Fujita 4 tornado touched down in
Manhattan, Kansas, including on the campus of Kansas State University, which is where
NBAF will be located.
Each of the four release scenarios have differing: (1) probabilities of an event occurring, (2)
amount of FMDv released, and (3) the means by which the virus is transported in the environ-
ment. Thus, this information is used to calculate the probability that any given premises
becomes infected with FMDv. Further details about the different release mechanisms can be
found in [16] pages 405–412 and 480–507.
Additionally, the first three events represent unannounced events while the latter scenario
represents an announced event. It is important to distinguish between these two types of unin-
tentional releases as an unannounced release could continue to spread the FMDv until the dis-
ease is identified and confirmed by officials. In the event of an announced released, control and
mitigation plans (e.g., animal movement bans, increased surveillance, etc.) could be immedi-
ately implemented, potentially reducing the impacts.
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Results
Epidemiological Output
The results from the disease spread model are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. Results are
reported for the distribution of outcomes at 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles of outbreaks based
on animals culled. This provides a range of consequences that may arise from an FMD out-
break. To better reflect uncertainty inherent in the potential different outbreak starting loca-
tions (i.e., cow-calf operation, feedlot, etc.), additional consequences are reported for the 5th,
50th, and 95th percentiles based on location of the index case. For example, P5/P50 implies the
5th percentile of epidemiological output based on culled animals and the 50th percentile of epi-
demiological output based on starting location.
In all release events, there were several assumptions regarding vaccinations including: (1) an
emergency vaccination program was implemented after the first animal was infected; (2) the
FMD vaccination supply was not a limiting constraint; (3) a 10 km vaccination ring was
employed; (4) all animals that were vaccinated were culled unless the outbreak lasted longer
than 2 quarters, at which the culling of vaccinated animals ceased at the end of the 2nd quarter.
Those animals that were vaccinated and not culled remained in the inventory.
In the aerosol, liquid waste, and transference release events, there are 10 scenarios in which
the outbreak lasted less than 2 quarters (i.e., vaccinate-to-kill policy); 7 of those scenarios were
less than 49 days in duration (Table 3). Additionally, the number of animals culled in those sce-
narios generally was less than 1.2 million head. The remaining scenarios were a vaccinate-to-
live policy and ranged in duration from 266 to 533 days. The number of animals culled ranged
between 6.0 and 27.4 million head for the longer duration scenarios.
The tornado release event results have one noticeable difference: the upper bound of ani-
mals culled and duration of outbreaks was smaller when compared to the other three release
events, but the lower bound was much higher. In other words, the 5th percentile of epidemio-
logical output resulted in 6.0 million head culled with a duration of 240 days, which is much
larger than the other three release events (Table 3). The number of animals culled and length
of the outbreak for the 95th percentile of epidemiological output scenario was 20.6 million head
and 533 days. Although the duration of 533 days was the same as other three release event sce-
narios, the number of animals culled was much smaller in the 95th percentile scenario. The
impacts at the 5th percentile were larger due to the initial spread of the virus by the tornado.
Because this release event is in effect a self-announcement, mitigation and control plans are
put into place immediately and a higher probability of observing and reporting the disease by a
producer, which can be seen at the 95th percentile of epidemiological output based on culled
animals.
The numbers of livestock vaccinated follow a similar pattern as duration and number of ani-
mals culled. The P5/P5 and P95/P95 scenarios result in the smallest and largest number of vac-
cinations administered, respectively (Table 4). The fewest vaccines administered are 0 in the
Liquid Waste release event for P5/P5 while the P95/P95 scenario for the Transference release
scenario results in over 65 million vaccinations.
Economic Consequences
To determine the total economic impact for a scenario, the changes in producer returns
to capital and management and consumer welfare, government indemnification and
non-indemnification expenditures, and the costs to the non-agricultural regional sector were
summed together.
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Liquid Waste Release. Losses for the liquid waste release scenario range from $0 to
$138,889 million in damage (Table 6). The 5th percentile epidemiological output and 5th and
50th location quartiles resulted in no detection and spread of FMD (Table 4). Thus, no eco-
nomic damages were incurred. In the P5/P95 scenario (5th percentile in epidemiological output
and 95th percentile for starting location), changes in producer returns to capital and manage-
ment were a decline of $19,920 million while changes in consumer welfare increased by $3,489
million. The positive effect on consumers was a result of a small production shock, small
Table 6. Agricultural and Regional Non-Agricultural Impacts and Government Costs of Hypothetical FMDOutbreak (Millions $).
Changes in Government Costs
Event Output/
Location
Producer Returns to
Capital and Management
Consumer
Surplus
Indemniﬁcation Non-
Indemniﬁcation
Regional Non-
Agriculture Impacts
Total
Liquid Waste
p5/p5 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
p5/p50 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
p5/p95 -$19,920 $3,489 $18 $3 -$39 -$16,491
p50/p5 -$18,752 $4,061 $1,414 $288 -$1,143 -$17,536
p50/p50 -$56,869 -$51,990 $1,903 $1,730 -$3,726 -$116,218
p50/p95 -$64,027 -$60,322 $4,614 $3,216 -$4,152 -$136,331
p95/p5 -$47,578 -$43,436 $2,322 $771 -$831 -$94,938
p95/p50 -$61,231 -$58,915 $8,377 $5,387 -$2,433 -$136,343
p95/p95 -$60,679 -$58,701 $9,844 $5,604 -$4,061 -$138,889
Aerosol
p5/p5 -$19,909 $3,480 $30 $6 -$50 -$16,515
p5/p50 -$19,733 $3,483 $259 $103 -$179 -$16,791
p5/p95 -$28,154 -$26,128 $1,594 $373 -$2,827 -$59,076
p50/p5 -$19,349 $3,697 $691 $154 -$438 -$16,935
p50/p50 -$56,573 -$51,877 $2,187 $2,097 -$2,440 -$115,174
p50/p95 -$62,610 -$60,274 $6,424 $3,984 -$2,600 -$135,892
p95/p5 -$60,842 -$59,389 $8,693 $4,954 -$3,063 -$136,941
p95/p50 -$61,238 -$58,965 $8,416 $5,367 -$3,718 -$137,704
p95/p95 -$60,646 -$58,723 $9,850 $5,600 -$4,645 -$139,464
Transference
p5/p5 -$19,796 $3,576 $163 $27 -$163 -$16,573
p5/p50 -$19,660 $3,646 $320 $62 -$310 -$16,706
p5/p95 -$58,229 -$52,239 $521 $270 -$1,982 -$113,241
p50/p5 -$39,473 -$33,066 $2,252 $702 -$983 -$76,476
p50/p50 -$55,919 -$51,213 $3,107 $2,348 -$1,627 -$114,214
p50/p95 -$61,445 -$59,895 $7,457 $4,241 -$4,087 -$137,125
p95/p5 -$60,726 -$59,506 $8,662 $4,925 -$3,062 -$136,881
p95/p50 -$61,238 -$59,170 $8,269 $5,028 -$3,128 -$136,833
p95/p95 -$60,544 -$58,966 $9,850 $5,621 -$3,543 -$138,524
Tornado
p5/p5 -$39,496 -$33,174 $2,252 $706 -$802 -$76,430
p5/p50 -$39,560 -$33,108 $2,264 $763 -$1,176 -$76,871
p5/p95 -$39,262 -$33,009 $2,522 $918 -$3,131 -$78,842
p50/p5 -$39,478 -$33,220 $2,243 $725 -$760 -$76,426
p50/p50 -$56,074 -$52,452 $2,585 $1,228 -$2,622 -$114,961
p50/p95 -$62,412 -$60,102 $6,327 $3,670 -$4,147 -$136,658
p95/p5 -$47,557 -$43,605 $2,350 $786 -$2,204 -$96,502
p95/p50 -$64,450 -$61,619 $3,396 $3,041 -$2,281 -$134,787
p95/p95 -$62,056 -$59,981 $7,410 $4,290 -$3,828 -$137,565
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129134.t006
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adverse reactions from consumers, and trade sanctions. In other words, it is possible for con-
sumers of meat and dairy products to benefit from an FMD outbreak, if it is small in nature
and consumer reactions are limited because of trade sanctions on agricultural exports leads to
oversupply and reduce U.S. meat and dairy prices [3, 22, 49–50]. Producer and consumer
impacts for P50/P5 are similar in size to P5/P95 while the remaining distribution of epidemio-
logical and starting location impacts range from declines of $47,578 to $64,027 million and
declines of $43,436 to $60,322 million for producers and consumers, respectively. In all release
event scenarios, the negative impacts to consumers are smaller than that of the producers.
The regional non-agricultural effects were negative and range from $0 to losses of $4,152
billion (Table 6). Although government indemnification payments replace the value of lost
livestock, it is not enough to offset the full economic impact on the region. The government
costs associated in eradicating an FMD outbreak range from $0 to $15,448 million with 50 to
85 percent of that due to indemnity payments (Table 6).
Table 6 summarizes the distributional cumulative economic impact across the entire study
period for the liquid waste release (beginning in 2009 and ending in 2018). However, conse-
quences of disease outbreaks are inherently dynamic in nature with benefits and costs accruing
differently to producers and consumers across time, and this interplay has important policy
implications [5]. Fig 1 illustrates the changes in producer returns to capital and management
by agricultural sector across time for the P50/P50 Liquid Waste scenario. After an outbreak is
announced there is an immediate negative effect on the swine and beef cattle sectors of about
$2,400 million. This is due to the loss of livestock, meat, and dairy export markets, reduced
demand for red meat and dairy products by domestic consumers, and culled animals. When
the outbreak is officially declared over (the 5th quarter), the beef cattle sector’s producers
returns to capital and management has rebounded to the pre-outbreak levels while the swine
sector’s recovery to pre-disease outbreak levels occurs approximately four quarters later (the
9th quarter). This result is mostly due to the amount of exports lost by both sectors; approxi-
mately 7% and 17% of U.S. beef and swine production in 2009 was exported, respectively. After
the 5th quarter, beef producers experience positive returns, and do so for the next 17 quarters,
primarily a result of lower grain and forage prices, consumer demand fully recovering, and the
gradual recovery of export markets. Swine producers also have positive gains, but not as large
of gains as the beef cattle producers.
Losses to the meat processing sector’s returns to capital and management decline from the
onset of the outbreak until the peak in the 8th quarter, where the loss in that quarter is approxi-
mately $2,813 billion (Fig 1). These losses are a result of lower beef prices due to the oversupply
of beef (i.e., loss of the export markets). Similar to the meat processing, producer returns to
management and capital in the crops sector decline. However, the losses in the crops sector are
Table 7. Changes in Aggregate Producer Returns to Capital and Management for LiquidWaste Event,
P50/P50 Scenario.
Sector Millions $
Meat Processing -26,055.61
Eggs and Layers 248.97
Dairy Cattle and Milk -1,634.26
Beef Cattle 14,696.28
Swine -10,577.89
Lambs and Sheep 72.86
Crops -35,989.54
Soybean Processing 187.59
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129134.t007
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Fig 1. Changes in Producers Returns to Capital and Management for Liquid Waste Event, P50/P50 Scenario.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129134.g001
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more severe and continue to decline until the 11th quarter. These losses (which include grains,
forage, and pasture) are a result of less demand from fewer cattle and swine. Additionally, the
2009 grains prices were far above U.S. government support levels, thus, price support payments
had little, if any, effect. Both the meat processing and crops sectors producer returns do not
fully recover to pre-disease levels by the 40th quarter. Although producer returns to capital and
management for the remaining sectors (eggs and layers, dairy cattle and milk, lambs and
sheep, and soybean processing) are positive or negative, they are very small.
Table 7 reports aggregate changes in producer returns to capital and management across
the 40 quarters by sector. This perhaps gives the best overview of the impacts to the agriculture
industry in this hypothetical FMD outbreak. Additional Liquid Waste scenarios reported in
DHS [16] remain qualitatively similar, but do vary according to the degree of the outbreak.
Aerosol Release. In the event of an accidental release of the FMDv through an aerosol, the
total economic impacts range from losses of $16,515 million to $139,464 million (Table 6). The
range of losses to the agricultural producers was $19,733 million for the P5/P50 scenario to
$62,610 million for the P50/P95 scenario. The small localized FMD outbreaks that lasted less
than a quarter in duration, P5/P5, P5/P50, and P5/P50 scenarios, resulted in gains to consum-
ers of about $3,500 million. The P5/P95 scenario resulted in a decline in consumer welfare of
$26,128 million while the remaining scenarios saw much larger declines in consumer welfare
ranging from $51,877 to $60,274 million because of the duration of the outbreak and number
of animals culled and vaccinated. The government indemnification costs range from $30 mil-
lion for the P5/P5 scenario to $9,850 million for the P95/P95 scenario. The non-indemnifica-
tion costs are smaller with a range of $6 million to $5,600 million. Finally, the impacts to the
regional non-agricultural sectors are declines of $50 million to $4,645 million across the sce-
narios. The distribution of losses by production type across time is qualitatively similar to the
Liquid Waste scenario described above.
Transference Release. Because the duration of the FMD outbreaks and number of animals
culled and vaccinated are similar to the aerosol scenarios, the total economic impacts of the
transference release scenarios are similar to impacts of an aerosol release, including the distri-
bution of impacts by production types across time. Losses to producers range from $19,660
million to $61,445 million while changes in consumer welfare are a positive $3,576 million to a
negative $59,895. Government indemnification and non-indemnification costs range from
$163 million and $27 million to $9,850 million and $5,621 million, respectively. Regional non-
agricultural impacts range from $163 million to $4,087 million in the losses resulting from
hypothetical FMD outbreaks.
Tornado Release. Tornado events are unlike the previous releases because of immediate,
widespread dispersion and the events are effectively self-announced. The economic impacts
were estimated in the event the FMDv is released because a tornado comprises the containment
laboratories at NBAF. With a tornado release event, the duration of an outbreak under the P5/
P5 scenario is 240 days compared to 0, 28, and 35 days in the liquid waste, aerosol, and trans-
ference scenarios, respectively. Additionally, the number of animals culled in the P5/P5 sce-
nario is significantly higher when compared to the other three release scenarios (approximately
5.8 million more animals are culled). Thus, the lower end of the range of total economic
impacts for this scenario is much larger because more animals are culled and the duration is
longer at the lower end of the distribution (P5/P5). Although the impacts are larger at the
lower end of the distribution, the impacts at the upper end of the distribution (P95/P95) are
smaller because fewer animals are culled. The total economic impacts range from losses of
$76,426 million to $137,565 million. Similar to the aerosol and transference release events, pro-
ducers lose along the entire distribution of outcomes. However, consumers do not gain in any
at any point along the distribution. When compared to the other three release events, the range
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of government costs is smaller. However, the P5/P5 scenario has much larger government
costs while the P95/P95 costs are smaller for both indemnification and non-indemnification.
The lower and upper ends of the distribution for regional non-agricultural impacts are losses
of $760 million and $3,828 million, respectively.
Conclusions and Implications
United States animal agriculture is becoming a highly integrated and global system that is
very important both domestically and internationally. This complex system combined with
the increasing frequency of emerging infectious disease threatens the stability of the U.S.
economy, food security, and livestock and public health. This economic analysis is part of a
congressionally mandated site specific risk assessment, which links outcomes from plume and
epidemiological models to risk outcomes. This study examines the economic consequences of
foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDv) releases from a national disease research facility. Specifi-
cally, we investigate the economic impacts to consumers and firms, costs to the government,
and disruptions to non-agricultural regional sectors.
Outcomes of the site-specific risk assessment have been and are currently being imple-
mented in the form of feedback into the planning and construction process of the National
Bio- and Agro Defense Facility (NBAF), along with improvements in scientific and economic
modeling. Given the projected investment costs of over $1 billion and the risks related to
potential foreign animal and zoonotic disease releases, feedback into the planning and con-
struction of the facility is critical to enhance future food security.
Unlike previous studies that focused on various alternate mitigation strategies, this
study focuses on potential animal disease releases from NBAF. The release events modeled
include aerosol, liquid waste, and transference (unannounced release events) and a tornado
(announced release event). Indeed, differences in the distribution of economic consequences
arise between the unannounced and announced events. Mitigation controls used includes
stamping out, vaccinate-to-live and vaccinate-to-kill. Although this is not a definitive study of
FMD vaccination, the economic consequences from the selected scenarios are informative to
government planners and policy makers. Schroeder et al. [3] find that emergency vaccination
can be a cost effective mitigation tool that can help reduce the spread of disease. They conclude
that a high-capacity emergency vaccination program together with large vaccination zones
results in significant savings to consumers, producers, and the government.
Total losses for the reported FMDv release events range from about $16 billion to $140 bil-
lion in damages. Producer effects are always negative due to lost output and reduced prices and
share the largest burden in losses. Consumers realize negative or positive effects primarily con-
tingent upon the size of the outbreak, export losses, and assumed demand shocks. Regional
non-agricultural losses and government indemnification (non-indemnification) costs are
much smaller than the producer and consumer impacts, ranging from $39 million to over
$4,500 million and from $18 million to nearly $10,000 million ($3 million to over $5,600 mil-
lion) across the scenarios, respectively. These economic impacts across the four release events
are similar, except for the tornado release event. Because the tornado release event is effectively
an announced event and the virus dispersion is greater, lower bound economic losses are much
larger than the unannounced releases while the upper bound of the economic consequences is
much smaller.
Several additional key insights are identified. First, it is important to integrate time into the
economic analysis, as livestock are durable goods. Costs and benefits evolve over time in
response to producer decisions, consumer reactions, and international trade responses by trad-
ing partners. Second, disaggregation among production types is vital to link epidemiological to
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economic models. Furthermore, this allows for additional analysis on how the different pro-
duction sectors are impacted. Third, size of the outbreak and duration of trade sanctions are
important. Fourth, the timing of identifying an FMDv release (announced vs. unannounced) is
important and has differing economic consequences. Similar to all hypothetical foreign animal
disease studies that report economic consequences, they are conditional in nature. Not only are
they conditional on the available information and modeling assumptions, but they are condi-
tional on an outbreak occurring. While it is plausible that FMDv releases may arise from
NBAF, estimated probabilities of the sequence of events leading to an outbreak are not large
[16]. Nevertheless, as actual events and empirical evidence demonstrate, FMD events are low
probability high cost events that deserve continued vigilance and research to mitigate the
consequences.
This study is not without limitations. Total costs could be overestimated if, for example, the
impact of tourism is diverted to different areas or the purchase delayed/deferred. However, the
estimated costs provide plausible estimates using standard economic techniques. The modeling
approach assumes homogenous commodities and goods, including beef. FMD outbreaks are
treated as shocks to economic system and are not endogenous to the model. Trade is not differ-
entiated among trading partners, but rather differentiated by domestic and international mar-
kets. Capacity constraints need to be investigated for processing infected animals, as well as
capital constraints. Nevertheless, the modeling framework provides the appropriate fidelity to
assess economic consequences.
This study does raise questions for future research. First, additional research needs to be
completed on vaccination strategies and capacity constraints. Second, trade sanctions and
trade agreements need to be studied further. Third, government costs and the structure of gov-
ernment costs should be examined to better understand the nature of public expenditures.
Fourth, potential benefits resulting from research, diagnostic tests, and training of personnel
would have positive impacts. The extent of those benefits needs to be investigated. Fifth, sensi-
tivity analysis on the economic parameters deserves further examination. Finally, further
implementation of an iterative risk assessment may provide interactive feedback and subse-
quent updating of information that could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the risk
assessment and facility construction process.
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